Wells Fargo Armored Service Corporation *and* **Truck Drivers Local Union No. 807, International Brotherhood of Teamsters, Chauffeurs, Warehousemen and Helpers of America** *and* **Fred M. Caputo.** Cases 2-CA-17305 and 2-CA-17394

18 May 1984

DECISION AND ORDER

BY CHAIRMAN DOTSON AND MEMBERS ZIMMERMAN, HUNTER, AND DENNIS

On 3 March 1982 Administrative Law Judge Frank H. Itkin issued the attached decision. The Respondent filed exceptions and a supporting brief, and the General Counsel filed a brief in support of the judge's decision.

The Board has considered the decision and the record in light of the exceptions and briefs and has decided to affirm the judge's rulings, findings,[1] and conclusions only to the extent consistent with this Decision and Order.

Contrary to the judge, we find that the Respondent was privileged to withdraw recognition from the Union at the time that it did, and, accordingly, we find that the Respondent did not violate the Act as alleged.

The Union, a so-called mixed guard union,[2] had represented a unit of the Respondent's guard employees since June 1979 pursuant to the Respondent's voluntary recognition of the Union as collective-bargaining representative in that unit. On 28 February 1980[3] the Respondent and the Union began negotiations for a new contract to replace the one due to expire 16 March. Negotiations continued through the contract's 16 March expiration date, but the parties were unable to resolve substantial issues. Then on 14 April the Respondent's guards picketed the Respondent's terminals and commenced an economic strike against the Respondent. The parties had sporadic discussions during the strike but were unable to reach an agreement. On 2 June, while the strike was still in progress, the Respondent withdrew recognition from the Union. The guards thereafter continued to strike. The judge found that the Respondent's withdrawal of recognition was violative of Section 8(a)(5) and (1) of the Act and that the economic strike was converted to an unfair labor practice strike 2 June when the Respondent withdrew recognition.

In finding the violation, the judge concluded that the Respondent withdrew recognition based solely on an economic consideration, i.e., the Union's refusal to accept its final contract offer. In light of its earlier recognition of the Union, the judge then concluded that the Respondent was "estopped" from withdrawing recognition for this reason. The judge found nothing in Section 9(b)(3) of the Act inconsistent with such a finding. We disagree.[4]

Section 9(b)(3) of the Act indicates that the Board shall not:

> . . . decide that any unit is appropriate for [collective-bargaining] purposes if it includes, together with other employees, any individual employed as a guard to enforce against employees and other persons rules to protect property of the employer or to protect the safety of persons on the employer's premises; but *no labor organization shall be certified as the representative of employees in a bargaining unit of guards if such organization admits to membership, or is affiliated directly or indirectly with an organization which admits to membership, employees other than guards.* [Emphasis added.]

It is the prohibition against certification contained in Section 9(b)(3) that is at issue here.

At the outset, there are several undisputed points about this section which are worth noting. It is clear that the Board is statutorily prohibited from certifying the Union in the unit of guards at issue here. This notwithstanding, it has been previously held that an employer may, if *it* chooses, recognize a mixed guard union for purposes of collective bargaining.[5] Thus, the Respondent's initial voluntary recognition of the Union was lawful even though the Board could not certify it as the bargaining representative of the guards. But now the Respondent desires to end that voluntary relationship. We conclude that the judge's decision that the Respondent cannot do so gives the Union indirectly—by a bargaining order—what it could not obtain directly—by certification—i.e., it compels the Respondent to bargain with the Union.[6] We see no

[1] The Respondent has excepted to some of the judge's credibility findings. The Board's established policy is not to overrule an administrative law judge's credibility resolutions unless the clear preponderance of all the relevant evidence convinces us that they are incorrect. *Standard Dry Wall Products*, 91 NLRB 544 (1950), enfd. 188 F.2d 362 (3d Cir. 1951). We have carefully examined the record and find no basis for reversing the findings.

[2] A mixed guard union is one which represents guards but which also admits nonguards to membership or is affiliated directly or indirectly with an organization which admits nonguards to membership.

[3] All dates refer to 1980.

[4] In reversing the judge, we find it unnecessary to pass on whether the Respondent would have been privileged to withdraw recognition within the contract term.

[5] *NLRB v. Motor Corp.*, 404 F.2d 1100 (6th Cir. 1968). But the choice is the employer's. The court in *White Motor Corp.* made it clear that, if the employer refuses any request to bargain from a mixed guard union, the employer commits no unfair labor practice. 404 F.2d at 1103-1104.

[6] Our dissenting colleague asserts our use of the term "bargaining order" is "specious" because it purportedly connotes we would be *estab-*

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basis for such a result and, indeed, we believe it is inconsistent with congressional intent as manifested by Section 9(b)(3) of the statute. The judge indicated that the language of Section 9(b)(3) prohibited *only* the certification of a mixed guard union but not the forced continuation of a bargaining relationship already established. However, the judge's distinction between establishing a bargaining relationship by certification and compelling continuation of an earlier voluntary relationship through a bargaining order completely overlooks the purpose for which Section 9(b)(3) was enacted.

Thus, Section 9(b)(3) was enacted by Congress in 1947 largely in response to the Supreme Court's decision in *NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp.*[7] *In Jones & Laughlin*, the Board had ordered the company to bargain with a union which it had certified in a guard unit even though the union also represented other company employees in a production unit. The Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit denied enforcement of the Board's Order in two decisions. In the key decision here, the second one, the court noted that at that time the guards were also police officers under the statutes of the State of Ohio. The court stated:[8]

> Their functions and obligations therefore are of a dual character. They have a private obligation to their employer and an obligation to the community as sworn, bonded and commissioned police officers. In case of industrial unrest and strikes on the part of the production employees, the obligations of the plant guards to the municipality and state would be incompatible with their obligations to the Union which, since it represents production employees, authorizes and directs the strike.

The Supreme Court in *Jones & Laughlin* reversed the Sixth Circuit and enforced the Board's Order. However, Congress was then undertaking an investigation of the employment status of guards and, ultimately, the House-Senate Conference Committee adopted the provision that is now Section 9(b)(3) of the National Labor Relations Act. It was decided that guards would retain their rights as statutory employees but, according to Senator Taft, the Committee was also "impressed" with the reasoning of the Sixth Circuit in *Jones & Laughlin*.[9] As a

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lishing a bargaining relationship rather than simply maintaining the relationship the Respondent itself created. We choose the term "bargaining order" simply because to find a violation here would then necessitate our issuing an "order to bargain"—as our colleague himself admits. And we are unable to do so here. Cf. *NLRB v. White Motor Corp.*, 404 F.2d at 1103; *Harrah's Marina Hotel*, 267 NLRB 1007 (1983); *Supreme Sugar Co.*, 258 NLRB 243 (1981); *Bambury Fashions*, 179 NLRB 447, 451 (1969); *Bausch & Lomb Optical Co.*, 108 NLRB 1555 (1954).

Our colleague claims that, while in certain circumstances the Board may not certify a union in a particular unit, it may nonetheless uphold a bargaining relationship earlier established by the parties in that unit. He cites three cases which all purportedly deal with the 9(b)(1) limitation that the Board may not find mixed units of professionals and nonprofessionals appropriate unless the professionals have had an opportunity to vote on their inclusion. However, Sec. 9(b)(1) is not applicable here. Further, contrary to our colleague's indication, the first case he cites, *Westinghouse Electric Corp. v. NLRB*, 236 F.2d 939 (3d Cir. 1956), did not involve an analysis of the 9(b)(1) limitation or of the Board's ability to allow parties to maintain a unit that the Board could not create. Rather, the court there dealt with a claim that a unit had to include all professionals and, because it did not, that it was inappropriate. The court rejected that claim but also stated, as pertinent, "[t]he proviso of Section 9(b)(1) refers to a mixed unit and is not applicable here for the unit we are considering is composed of all professional employees." 236 F.2d at 943.

In the second case our colleague cites, *Retail Clerks Local 324 (Vincent Drugs)*, 144 NLRB 1247 (1963), the Board *was* confronted with the issue of the parties' maintenance of a mixed unit that did not meet the 9(b)(1) standards. The union there attempted to have a professional employee who had never joined the union fired through the use of a union-security clause. The General Counsel alleged a violation against the union claiming the unit was inappropriate because the professionals had not been given their 9(b)(1) rights, and thus the union-security clause was unenforceable. The Board rejected the claim and drew a distinction between the Board's establishing such a unit and the parties' doing so. However, in making that distinction it relied heavily on the court's opinion in *Westinghouse*. This was an error because, as noted, *Westinghouse* did not deal with a mixed unit situation. Moreover, in *Vincent Drugs* the Board relied heavily on the legislative history of Sec. 9(b)(1) in reaching its decision. Here, we deal with another section, Sec. 9(b)(3), with a much less detailed legislative history. We will not here read into Sec. 9(b)(3) various legislative comments directed toward Sec. 9(b)(1) of the Act. Further, the issue in *Vincent Drugs*, dealing with an individual professional employee's relationship with the union, would now have to be analyzed in light of *Utah Power Co.*, 258 NLRB 1059 (1981), discussed infra. The last case cited by our colleague, *International Telephone & Telegraph Corp.*, 159 NLRB 1757 (1966), is discussed later in our decision.

We also note that our colleague's references to former Subsecs. 9(f), (g), and (h) of the Act do not dissuade us from the conclusion that the legislative history we describe infra regarding Sec. 9(b)(3) and the manner in which that section has been interpreted support the decision we reach here.

[7] 331 U.S. 416 (1947).

[8] 154 F.2d 932, 935 (6th Cir. 1946).

[9] While it is arguable that the Sixth Circuit and Supreme Court decisions in *Jones & Laughlin* focused on the narrower issue of the effect the guards' being deputized had on the question of whether the union could be certified by the Board, it is clear that Congress' focus on the status of guards was not nearly that narrow, and that the favorable reference to the Sixth Circuit decision in the legislative history was not premised on the basis that the plant guards at issue were also police officers. Rather, Congress decided that because of the special status of guards generally certain broad restrictions on their representation were necessary. Reference to the full text of Senator Taft's remarks bears this out. He stated:

> Section 9(b) is also the same as section 9(b) of the Senate amendment with the exception of an addition of a third clause relating to plant guards. As has been previously stated, the Senate rejected a provision in the House bill which would have excluded plant guards as employees protected by the act. The conferees on both sides, however, have been impressed with the reasoning of the Circuit Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit in the *Jones & Laughlin* case in which an order of the Board certifying as a bargaining representative of guards, the same union representing the production employees was set aside. Although this case was recently reversed by the Supreme Court on the ground that the Board had it within its power to make such a holding, four of the Justices agreed with the Circuit Court of Appeals holding that this was an abuse of the discretion permitted to the Board under the Act. One of the members of the Board has also expressed this view in a number of dissenting opinions. Under the language of clause (3), guards still retain their rights as employees under the National Labor Relations Act, but the Board is instructed not to place them in the same bargaining unit with other

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result, the two limitations of Section 9(b)(3) were set out—the first prohibiting the Board from treating a mixed unit of guards and nonguards as appropriate and the second prohibiting the certification of a mixed guard union in a guard unit.

It is clear that the remarks of Senator Taft show that Congress' purpose in enacting Section 9(b)(3) was to shield employers of guards from the potential conflict of loyalties arising from the guard union's representation of nonguard employees or its affiliation with other unions who represent nonguard employees. However, this potential conflict of loyalties exists whether a mixed guard union is certified or not. Viewed in this light, there is no basis for the Board's drawing a distinction between initial certification and, as here, the compulsory maintenance of a bargaining relationship through the use of a bargaining order. In either case, saddling the employer with an obligation to bargain presents it with the same set of difficulties and the same potential conflict of loyalties that Section 9(b)(3) was designed to avoid.[10]

The General Counsel argues, however, that the language of Section 9(b)(3) at issue here only prohibits the Board's certifying the Union. But it is axiomatic that the legislative history of a provision must be analyzed and considered in applying the statute because the "circumstances of the enactment . . . may persuade a court that Congress did not intend words of common meaning to have their literal effect."[11] In interpreting Section 9(b)(3), the Board itself has not confined its analysis to the literal wording of Section 9(b)(3). Thus, more than 30 years ago, in *Armored Motor Service*,[12] the Board held for the first time that armored car guards were "guards" within the meaning of Section 9(b)(3). The Board found that this conclusion, while not required by the plain language of Section 9(b)(3),[13] was compelled by the policy underlying the section. In *Armored Motor Service*, the Board stated:[14]

> The danger of divided loyalty which Congress sought to eliminate may not be quite so far-reaching in the case of armored-car guards [as opposed to plant guards], but it is, nevertheless, present. A conflict of loyalty could arise, for example, if the guards should be called upon to deliver money or valuables to one of their customers whose employees were represented by the same union as represented the armored-car guards and the employees of the customer were on strike and picketing the premises of the customer.
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> Accordingly, we overrule the decision in the *Brink's* case, *supra*, and hold that armored-car guards are guards within the meaning of Section 9(b)(3). These guards are obviously employed to protect property within the meaning of the statute, and, in view of the statutory language, we do not consider it controlling that the money and valuables which they protect belong not to their own employer but to a customer of their employer.

The Board in *Armored Motor Service* thus went beyond the language of the statute to give effect to the purpose of Congress in finding armored car guards to be statutory guards. In the instant case, a too literal reading of the statute effectively would thwart that congressional purpose.

Finally, we turn to the judge's conclusion that the Respondent should be "estopped" from withdrawing recognition because it had previously extended recognition to the Union.[15] In so concluding, the judge relied on *International Telephone & Telegraph Corp.*[16] In *ITT*, a Board majority held that an employer was "estopped" from withdrawing recognition from a union which it had voluntarily recognized for 13 years in a mixed unit of

employees, or to certify as bargaining representatives for the guards a union which admits other employees to membership or is affiliated directly or indirectly with labor organizations admitting employees other than guards to membership.

93 Cong.Rec. S6444 (1947) (remarks of Sen. Taft). Indeed, the Board has so construed the legislative history since 1948. See *Schenley Distilleries*, 77 NLRB 468 (1948), and *International Harvester*, 145 NLRB 1747, 1750 fn. 8 (1964).

Thus, our colleague's proposal that one reading of the legislative history is that Sec. 9(b)(3) is only applicable where the guards involved have a connection with "public or governmental" entities is clearly in error.

[10] The judge rejected the Respondent's assertion that its withdrawal of recognition was based on its concern over "security" and "conflict of loyalties" and instead found that the Respondent withdrew recognition for economically motivated reasons. We accept this conclusion for purposes of this case. However, that does not alter our decision here because it is undisputed that the Respondent's employees are statutory guards and that the Union also represents nonguards. Thus, the *potential* for a conflict of loyalties always exists. In fact, in April 1980 while the parties were still negotiating such an occasion for a demonstrated conflict of loyalties arose. At another location the Union established a picket line which the Respondent's guards, represented by the Union, refused to cross. As a result, the guards' armored vehicle, with its cargo, was left stranded on the street. Hence, on at least one occasion the potential for a conflict of loyalties which concerned the Congress turned into a reality.

[11] *Watt v. Alaska*, 451 U.S. 259, 266 (1981).

[12] 106 NLRB 1139 (1953).

[13] As noted, Sec. 9(b)(3) defines a "guard" as "any individual employed . . . to enforce against employees and other persons rules to protect property *of the employer* or to protect the safety of persons on the employer's premises [emphasis added]." Armored car guards primarily protect property belonging not to their employer, but to customers of their employer.

[14] 106 NLRB at 1140.

[15] We note in passing that this recognition was for less than 1 year and that most of that time was governed by the Union's predecessor's bargaining agreement. We find the Respondent's longstanding recognition of the Union's predecessor to be irrelevant.

[16] 159 NLRB 1757 (1966), enfd. as modified 382 F.2d 366 (3d Cir. 1967).

professional and nonprofessional employees notwithstanding the fact that the professional employees had never voted in a self-determination election as required by Section 9(b)(1) of the Act. In finding a violation in the employer's withdrawal of recognition, the Board noted the consensual nature of the parties' relationship but also noted their long bargaining history and the fact that the withdrawal occurred in a context of other unremedied unfair labor practices. Here, by contrast, the parties' relationship was less than 1 year old when recognition was withdrawn, and recognition was withdrawn in a context free of other unfair labor practices.

In reaching its conclusion, the Board in *ITT* further noted that its holding was "not to be construed as foreclosing the professionals in the unit from seeking [a] self-determination [election] at an appropriate time and in the appropriate proceeding."[17] This comment has great significance here in light of another Board decision which was not discussed by the judge. In *Utah Power Co.*,[18] the Board referred to the "estoppel" theory relied on in *ITT*. In *Utah Power*, as in *ITT*, professional employees had been included in a unit with nonprofessional employees without being afforded an opportunity to vote in a self-determination election as required by Section 9(b)(1). In *Utah Power*, however, the Board determined that the professional employees were not precluded from asserting their statutory rights to a self-determination election although they had accepted their situation for *43 years*. In so finding, the Board *distinguished ITT* and noted that the proceeding in *Utah Power* "was initiated at an appropriate time by professional employees under a provision intended for their protection."[19] Contrary to the judge, we conclude that here the Respondent was not estopped from withdrawing recognition from the Union because the estoppel theory, as shown in *Utah Power*, does not operate to preclude the *intended beneficiary* of the statute from asserting rights thereunder. Inasmuch as the Respondent obviously belongs to the class which is the intended beneficiary of Section 9(b)(3), it was not estopped from asserting its rights under that section by refusing to bargain with the Union when it did.[20]

In sum, while we agree that the Respondent and the Union could enter into a valid voluntary collective-bargaining relationship, we find that the Respondent was privileged to withdraw from the relationship at the time that it chose to do so.[21] Accordingly, we conclude that the Respondent did not violate Section 8(a)(5) and (1) by withdrawing recognition from the Union on 2 June, and we also conclude that the economic strike was not converted to an unfair labor practice strike upon the Respondent's withdrawal of recognition.

ORDER

The complaint is dismissed.

MEMBER ZIMMERMAN, dissenting.

Section 9(b)(3) states that, with respect to guards, the Board shall not do two things. One, it shall not "decide that any unit is appropriate" when it includes both guards and nonguards. The unit involved here does not. Consisting as it does of all nonsupervisory guards employed by the Respondent, it obviously is an appropriate unit and I do not read the majority's opinion as suggesting otherwise. Two, Section 9(b)(3) states the Board shall not "certif[y] as the representative" of an all-guards unit any union which further admits nonguards to membership or is affiliated with another union which does.

Today, in a novel but untenably expansive construction of Section 9(b)(3), the Board holds that this latter proscription privileges the Respondent to withdraw from its voluntarily entered into bargaining relationship "when it did," "at the time that it chose to do so," and "on 2 June."[1] This view of

[17] Id. at 1764 fn. 15.

[18] 258 NLRB 1059.

[19] Id. at 1061 fn. 14.

[20] Member Dennis finds *ITT* distinguishable on the basis stated in this paragraph. She does not find the length of the bargaining relationship or the absence of other unfair labor practices to be relevant distinguishing factors.

[21] We find cases such as *Amoco Oil Co.*, 221 NLRB 1104 (1975), distinguishable from the instant case. In finding a violation in *Amoco*, the Board expressly noted that the employer there *admitted* the mixed guard union's status as collective-bargaining representative and did not attack the bargaining relationship. This is precisely the opposite of what the Respondent is contending here; hence, *Amoco* has little relevance. Likewise, the issues presented in *Bally's Park Place*, 257 NLRB 777 (1981) (mixed guard union's name may appear on a ballot as an intervenor in a representation election), and *Burns Detective Agency*, 134 NLRB 451 (1961) (normal contract-bar rules apply to a collective-bargaining agreement between an employer and a mixed guard union), are irrelevant to the issues in this proceeding.

We thus find it unnecessary to decide whether *Amoco*, *Bally's*, and *Burns* were correctly decided, as we agree they are inapposite.

[1] My colleagues employ such terminology because, in their words, they "find it unnecessary to pass on whether the Respondent would have been privileged to withdraw recognition within the contract term" too. Similarly, they find the Board's decision in *Burns Detective Agency*, 134 NLRB 451 (1961), both "irrelevant" and "inapposite" to the issue posed here. See also *Wallace-Murray Corp.*, 192 NLRB 1090 (1971), to which the majority does not allude but in which the Board did not permit an employer to amend, much less walk away from, an extant contract which covered a mixed unit of guards and nonguards, that is, a unit which the Board could *not* decide was appropriate under Sec. 9(b)(3). I agree that the principles reflected in *Burns* and *Wallace-Murray*, in a technical sense, do not control here. But those cases are nonetheless quite relevant. For, if a respondent *could* withdraw recognition during a contract term from a voluntarily recognized mixed union, the net result, in light of today's decision, would be that the 9(b)(3) bar against "certifying" a mixed union as the representative of an all-guards unit becomes no less than the statutory equivalent of Sec. 8(f) and/or Sec. 14(a). If that is the construction this majority gives to Sec. 9(b)(3), it should tell us so. If it has yet not made up its mind, I believe it should await that moment before deciding this case.

Section 9(b)(3) is required, the majority asserts, because a literal adherence to the 9(b)(3) certification bar would give the "Charging Party indirectly—by a bargaining order—what it could not obtain directly—by certification" and that would be "inconsistent with congressional intent" behind Section 9(b)(3). The majority, in my judgment, has both mischaracterized the question and misread the legislative history.

Usage of the term "bargaining order" strikes me as particularly specious in a case of this character. True, if the Charging Party were to prevail, the Board would issue an Order which would have the effect of requiring the Respondent to bargain. But we would not thereby be *establishing* the bargaining obligation. The Respondent itself did that. Our Order more fairly would be characterized as one compelling Respondent to *maintain* the relationship it, not we, created.

The distinction between the Board's creation and maintenance of a unit has long been recognized. In *Westinghouse Electric Corp. v. NLRB*, 236 F.2d 939 (3d Cir. 1956), which involved the 9(b)(1) limitation with respect to mixed professional and nonprofessional employee bargaining units, the court characterized that limitation as having the "obvious effect" of being "merely a limitation on the Board's power to *create*" such units.[2] In part relying on *Westinghouse*, the Board made the same distinction between its establishment of a unit and its upholding of the validity of such a unit in *Retail Clerks Local 324 (Vincent Drugs)*, 144 NLRB 1247 (1963)—today found to be "error" by my colleagues. And it was on the basis of *Westinghouse* and *Vincent Drugs* that the Board, in *International Telephone & Telegraph Corp.*, 159 NLRB 1757 (1966), issued the very bargaining order the majority now says it is not empowered to issue.

Moreover, the distinction finds support in the enactment, contemporaneous with the enactment of Section 9(b)(3), of former Subsections 9(f), (g), and (h). For those sections demonstrate that, when Congress wished to disqualify a union not only from certification but, more broadly, from resort to the Board for the protection of existing bargaining relationships, Congress well knew how to achieve that end. All three subsections not only disqualified noncomplying unions from having their petitions processed, they further, and specifically, provided that their charges could not result in complaints. Indeed, in *NLRB v. Mine Workers District 50*, 355 U.S. 453 (1958), the Supreme Court held that a Board Order requiring an employer to withdraw recognition from the Mine Workers unless and until it was certified by the Board was an abuse of Board discretion *precisely because* the Mine Workers Union was noncomplying and therefore could not be certified. The Court reasoned that, in the context of an unfair labor practice proceeding,[3] the Mine Workers noncompliance with Section 9(f), (g), and (h) need not, and should not, have operated to frustrate the right of the employees involved to select the Mine Workers as their representative.

And the distinction finds support in the language of Section 9(b)(3) itself. Plainly, Congress could have written that mixed unions could not represent all-guards units. It did not. Given the shape Section 9(b)(3) ultimately took, Congress plainly could have written that the Board should not decide to be appropriate either a mixed unit or a unit which, though not mixed, was represented or sought to be represented by a mixed union. It did not. Instead, as the structure of Section 9(b)(3) makes evident, it permitted a unit composed exclusively of guards to be found by the Board to be appropriate whether or not it was represented or sought to be represented by a mixed union. The net effect is that cases involving voluntary recognition represent the precise circumstance which gives meaning to Congress' determination that the Board, though not able to certify a mixed union, could decide that the unit such a union represents is appropriate.

The legislative history of the section is consonant with such a construction. Certainly, and more importantly, nothing in it supports the view that when Congress wrote the Board should not certify mixed unions it meant to deprive them of not only certification, but also long-established rights flowing from voluntary recognition. Indeed, to the extent it can be read as overcoming the language of Section 9(b)(3), the legislative history more narrowly suggests that Congress only intended to prohibit the Board from *certifying some* mixed unions, namely, those which directly or indirectly admitted *coworkers* of the guards to membership. Previous Boards have recognized as much, but have construed the words of Section 9(b)(3) to mean precisely what they say.[4] Here, the Board refuses to do either, and so the legislative history commands renewed attention.

[2] 236 F.2d at 943, emphasis added.

[3] The Mine Workers had been found to have been an unlawfully assisted union within the proscription of Sec. 8(a)(2) upon charges filed by a Teamsters local in compliance with the provisions of Sec. 9(f), (g), and (h).

[4] See, e.g., *International Harvester*, 145 NLRB 1747 (1964). Like the Board there, I view Sec. 9(b)(3) as not restricted to situations in which the mixed union represents or seeks to represent coworkers of the guards. Like the Board there, I do so on the basis of the words of Sec. 9(b)(3) which define what has come to be called a mixed union. See my concurring position in *Bally's Park Place*, 257 NLRB 777 (1981).

Prior to Taft-Hartley, three recurring issues were posed by the representation of guards, all three of which were present, at one stage or another, in *Jones & Laughlin*.[5] The first was whether the guards were employees within the Act's meaning or excluded from coverage because of the purported supervisory, confidential, or managerial nature of their duties. The second was whether, if found to be employees, representation of the guards by the same union already representing their coworkers was so incompatible with their duties in relation to those coworkers that petitions for their representation by an incumbent union should be dismissed. With respect to both issues, the Board's consistent policy was to find the guards to be employees[6] and to permit their representation by incumbent unions.[7] Significantly, there is no case prior to Taft-Hartley in which representation of guards was attacked on the ground that the union seeking their representation *elsewhere* represented nonguards.

The third issue was the impact on both these policies of the widespread militarization of guards employed by employers producing war materiel during World War II. The Board's response to militarization, however, was the same, finding that it did not alter the employee status of the guards or their right to choose, in the words of Section 7, "representatives of their own choosing."[8]

In *Jones & Laughlin*, on application of the Board for enforcement of an Order premised on these principles, the Sixth Circuit denied enforcement finding that militarization did not alter the employee status of the guards but that it did alter the appropriateness of the unit. The finding was *not* based merely on a perceived conflict of loyalties in the representation of guards by a "mixed" union. The dispositive consideration was not even a perceived conflict of loyalties in the representation of the guards by the same union which represented Jones & Laughlin's production employees. It was, instead, the guards' militarization (146 F.2d at 721–723):

> We think that . . . the Board failed to give adequate consideration to the national welfare and this is a fundamental error. . . . [T]he Board failed to give effect to the fact that from December 11, 1941, the country was at war . . . [and] the further unquestionable fact that [the] respondent was engaged in the production of war material and other necessities for the armed forces and the national war effort. . . .
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> The national welfare is of supreme importance and especially is this true in time of war. The evidence reflects the deep concern of the Government for the . . . protection of [the respondent's plant] and for the integrity and volume of [its] products. . . .
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> When [the union was] selected as bargaining [agent] for the plant protection employees, these employees might in an effort to discharge their duty to their employer find themselves in conflict with other members of their Union over the enforcement of some rule . . . or upon the other hand, in conflict with the Federal Government because of fealty to the Union at the time of a dispute involving the public interest.

The impact of militarization in the initial Sixth Circuit decision in *Jones & Laughlin* is not debatable. When the case went to the Supreme Court, on conclusion of the war and the demilitarization of the guards, the Court remanded the case to the Sixth Circuit for reconsideration *because of* demilitarization.

As the majority notes, however, subsequent to demilitarization, but prior to reconsideration, the guards in *Jones & Laughlin* had become auxiliaries of the Cleveland police force, so that, in the Sixth Circuit's words, "[t]he precise question [on review was] not whether the plant guards should be permitted to organize, but whether the peculiar classification into which they [fell made] it improper for the Board to permit their organization by the same union which represent[ed] the production employees."[9]

If then Section 9(b)(3) were read as no more than codification of the Sixth Circuit's opinion in *Jones & Laughlin*, it might be construed as extending only to situations in which the guards sought to be represented shared some connection with public or governmental entities. The words of Section 9(b)(3), however, are far broader than that, as is other legislative history. Then again, if we were to read it as codification of one aspect of *Jones & Laughlin*—simultaneous representation of both

[5] *NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp.*, 331 U.S. 416 (1947), revg. 154 F.2d 932 (6th Cir. 1946). The Board's Decision and Direction of Election is reported at 49 NLRB 390 (1943). The Board's Order is reported at 53 NLRB 1046 (1943). The Sixth Circuit's original order denying enforcement is reported as amended at 146 F.2d 718 (6th Cir. 1945). The Supreme Court's grant of the Board's petition for certiorari, vacatur, and remand to the Sixth Circuit is reported at 325 U.S. 838 (1944).

[6] See, e.g., *Bendix Products.*, 3 NLRB 682 (1937); *Chrysler Corp.*, 36 NLRB 593 (1941).

[7] See, e.g., *Westinghouse Electric & Mfg. Co.*, 28 NLRB 799 (1940); *R.C.A. Mfg. Co.*, 30 NLRB 668 (1941).

[8] The first reported case on the impact of militarization is *Chrysler Corp.*, 44 NLRB 881 (1942). See especially *Drawo Corp.*, 52 NLRB 322 (1943).

[9] 154 F.2d at 934.

guards and their coworkers—we might construe the words of Section 9(b)(3) as only slightly different from what they are, prohibiting instead the certification of a labor organization which directly or indirectly admits "to membership . . . coemployees of guards." This reading has uniform support in the legislative history:

> [W]e provided that [plant guards] could have the protection of the Wagner Act only if they had a union separate and apart from *the union of the general employees.*[10]
>
> Although this case [the Sixth Circuit's holding in *Jones & Laughlin*] was recently reversed by the Supreme Court . . . four of the Justices agreed with the Circuit Court that this was an abuse of the discretion permitted to the Board under the Act. *One of the members of the Board has also expressed this view in a number of dissenting opinons.*[11]

Either reading, though narrowing the scope of Section 9(b)(3), at least could find some support in its legislative history. Here, the majority enlarges the scope of Section 9(b)(3) without any such support. Obviously, in enacting Section 9(b)(3) Congress was concerned with potential conflicts of loyalties. But Section 9(b)(3) is Congress' response to that concern and the response does not reflect a determination to prohibit a voluntarily recognized mixed union, or the employees it represents, from asserting rights under the statute shared by other unions and employees. The limitation on them is the one Congress put in Section 9(b)(3).

The result here is not only far beyond either the words of Section 9(b)(3) or its legislative history, it envisions a form of collective bargaining that is foreign to the statute as a whole. The majority's construction of the section ascribes to Congress an intention to permit an employer to voluntarily recognize a mixed union as representative of its guards subject to that union's, and those guards', understanding that the employer could walk away from the relationship perhaps at any time and certainly at any contract's end. Even if limited to the latter context, such voluntary bargaining is contrary to the stability of collective-bargaining relationships promoted by the statute.

The Charging Party here does not seek to have the Board certify it. It seeks, instead, to have the Board determine whether the Respondent lawfully withdrew recognition from it. The test for that, whether the recognition was voluntarily extended or not, is whether the Respondent had reasonable doubt about the union's continuing majority status based on objective considerations.[12] The Respondent seemingly concedes that is not the case. Indeed, as the judge found, this Respondent withdrew recognition in response to a bargaining stalemate. Neither Section 9(b)(3) nor its legislative history makes that an exception to the principles governing when recognition may be withdrawn.[13] I would find the withdrawal to be in violation of Section 8(a)(5).

[10] 2 Leg. Hist. 1544 (LMRA 1947) (remarks of Sen. Taft).

[11] The reference apparently is to former Member Reynolds. Compare id. at 1541 with 12 NLRB Annual Report 23 fn. 95 and cases there cited.

[12] See, e.g., *NLRB v. Windham Community Memorial Hospital*, 577 F.2d 805 (2d Cir. 1978); *Club Cal-Neva*, 231 NLRB 22 (1977).

[13] Under Sec 9(b)(1) professional employees are entitled to a separate vote on whether they wish to be included in a bargaining unit with nonprofessionals. The Board may not decide that any unit is appropriate if the professionals have not been included on that basis. That is to say, the prohibition running to the Board is to its "deciding the unit is appropriate." In *ITT*, 159 NLRB 1757, the employer withdrew recognition from a mixed unit of professionals and nonprofessionals. In other words, it was seeking to assert the professionals' 9(b)(1) privilege. *Utah Power Co.*, 258 NLRB 1059 (1981), on the other hand, was a unit case in which the professionals sought the separate unit that is theirs to seek under Sec. 9(b)(1). The two cases are in no way inconsistent. Nor are they relevant here despite my colleagues' discussion of the two cases and their unfounded suggestion that a respondent withdrawing recognition is the "beneficiary" of Sec. 9(b)(3). Sec. 9(b)(1) gives professionals, but not employers, the right to a separate vote. Sec. 9(b)(3) does not give an employer the right to withdraw recognition. It prohibits a union from receiving Board certification of it as the representative of a guards' unit when that union is a mixed one.

DECISION

FRANK H. ITKIN, Administrative Law Judge. The unfair labor practice charges in Cases 2-CA-17305 and 2-CA-17394 were filed on June 11 and July 15, 1980. A complaint issued on October 21, 1980, and was later amended at the hearing. The cases were tried in New York City on April 27 and 28 and July 13 through 17, 1981, and on January 6 and 7, 1982. Briefly, the General Counsel contends that Respondent Wells Fargo violated Section 8(a)(5) and (1) of the National Labor Relations Act by withdrawing recognition from Charging Party Local 807 on or about June 2, 1980, as the collective-bargaining agent of an appropriate unit consisting of the Company's "employees working on armored trucks and . . . employed in the meter collection operation at Respondent's facilities" in New York and New Jersey. The General Counsel further contends that the strike, which had started on or about April 14, 1980, was prolonged by the Company's unfair labor practices and, consequently, became an unfair labor practice strike on or about June 2, 1980. Respondent Wells Fargo denies that it has violated the Act as alleged. In particular, counsel for Respondent argues that the unit employees are "guards" under Section 9(b)(3) of the Act; that Local 807 admits to membership employees other than "guards"; and that, therefore, the Company "retains the right to end [its] relationship" with Local 807 whenever "it becomes dissatisfied or objects"— it "can pull out" of the bargaining relationship "anytime." Alternatively, counsel for Respondent asserts that a "conflict of loyalties," either actual or potential, arose between the parties and em-

ployee-members thereby permitting the Employer to withdraw recognition from Local 807 under Section 9(b)(3) of the Act.

On the entire record, including my observation of the demeanor of the witnesses, and after due consideration of the briefs filed by counsel, I make the following

FINDINGS OF FACT

Respondent Company provides armored car services for the transportation and delivery of moneys, securities, and other valuables. Respondent is admittedly an employer engaged in commerce as alleged. Charging Party Local 807, affiliated with the International Brotherhood of Teamsters, Chauffeurs, Warehousemen and Helpers of America, is admittedly a labor organization as alleged. On July 16, 1948, Local 820, also affiliated with the Teamsters International, was certified by the Board to execute a union-security agreement for Respondent's employees in a unit including "all chauffeurs, custodians and guards working on trucks in its armored car division." (See G.C. Exh. 21.) Respondent and Local 820 thereafter engaged in a bargaining relationship and executed a series of collective-bargaining agreements. The most recent contract between Respondent and Local 820 was effective from March 14, 1977, to March 16, 1980. (See G.C. Exh. 2.)[1]

On or about June 18, 1979, while the above contract was in effect, the Company was notified that Local 820 "has been merged into Local 807 . . . pursuant to a directive by the General Executive Board of the International Brotherhood of Teamsters . . . effective June 16, 1979" and that "Local 807 [is] the successor to all rights and duties in the 1977–1980 collective bargaining agreement." See R. Exh. 13. (Also see G.C. Exh. 13, R. Exhs. 16 and 17.) Representatives of Local 807 promptly met with representatives of the Company. Thereafter, Local 807 proceeded to administer the outstanding collective-bargaining contract and, commencing about February 26, 1980, held some 14 bargaining sessions with the Employer in an attempt to reach a new agreement.[2] The Company and Local 807 were unable to resolve substantial economic and noneconomic issues and, as discussed below, the Company made a "final offer" to the Union at the April 11 bargaining session. The Local 807 membership unanimously rejected this "final offer" on April 13 and a strike ensued. Then, by letter dated June 2, 1980, the Company notified Local 807 (G.C. Exh. 11):

> Please be advised that Wells Fargo Armored Service Corporation is, as of the date appearing hereinabove, withdrawing the voluntary recognition accorded Local 807 IBT as collective bargaining representative of the armored guard employees at Wells Fargo's New York City and Linden, New Jersey facilities.

The testimony and related documentary evidence pertaining to this withdrawal of recognition and the strike are summarized below.

Joseph Votta, recording secretary for Local 807, testified that Respondent Company was notified of the transfer of authority from Local 820 to Local 807 "shortly after the takeover" during June 1979; that Local 807 promptly began representing the Company's New York and New Jersey employees in the unit as provided in the 1977–1980 contract; that he met with various representatives of the Company during June or July 1979 in order to discuss the change in authority from Local 820 to Local 807; and that the Company did not question or dispute Local 807's right or authority to represent the unit employees. Votta recalled that Local 807, shortly after the takeover, received from the Company union dues previously withheld from the employees. (See C.P. Exhs. 2 and 3.) In addition, Votta recalled that he commenced processing grievances with the Company "on a regular basis" and that pending arbitration proceedings—started earlier by Local 820—were "carried over" by Local 807 and completed. (See G.C. Exh. 16 and C.P. Exh. 4.)

Further, Votta testified that he participated in the negotiations with the Company for a new contract, starting during late February 1980. The parties bargained over economic and noneconomic issues. Tentative agreements were reached pertaining to arbitration, bereavement leave, health coverage, and various "withdrawals" of proposals. Local 807 and the Company, during these negotiations, twice stipulated to an extension of the 1977–1980 contract and agreed to "retroactivity." (See G.C. Exh. 6.) However, as Votta recalled, at the April 11 bargaining session, Company Vice President Timothy Hughes announced that "we don't have to go any futher; this is out last and final offer; and that's it." Votta took the Company's "last and final offer" back to the membership who, on April 13, unanimously voted to strike. Picketing started the following day, April 14.

Subsequently, about May 28, Votta attended a bargaining session between the parties. Votta testified:

> [W]hen it first started off we were asked the question if there was any room to move, and we said yes there's always room to move. . . . [They, the Company,] asked in which way . . . and . . . we said we would move to 80, 70 and 70 [from 90, 80, and 80 cents in hourly wage increases during the first, second and third years of the proposed contract].
>
> . . . .
>
> [They] asked for a caucus and they went into another room . . . they were in there quite a while.

---

[1] The 1977–1980 contract recites (G.C. Exh. 2, p. 2):

> The Employer agrees to recognize the Union as the sole and exclusive bargaining agent for all of its employees working on its armored trucks and for those who are employed in its meter collection operation. This Agreement shall apply only to the aforesaid employees working out of the offices of the Employer in the metropolitan area of New York City, New York, and including Westchester, Nassau, Suffolk, Orange, Putnam and Rockland Counties in New York, and Essex, Bergen, Hudson, Passaic, Union and Morris Counties in New Jersey.

[2] The negotiating sessions between the Employer and Local 807 were held on February 26 and 27, March 5, 11, 12, 20, 21, 25, and 26, April 2, 11, and 24, and May 19 and 28, 1980. During these negotiations, the parties "stipulated" that the above contract be "extended" and that "all terms and conditions agreed upon in any successor agreement . . . will be retroactive to March 17, 1980." See G.C. Exh. 6. (Also see G.C. Exhs. 3, 4, 5, 7, 8, 9, and 10.)

Ultimately, as Votta recalled, Hughes stated that "it's over with" and "that was the end of the meeting." Thereafter, on June 2, Votta noted, "we got a copy of a letter stating that . . . they no longer recognized 807."

Michael Kelley testified that he was a member of Local 807's negotiating team; that he attended the bargaining sessions between the parties in 1980; and that at no time during these negotiations was "the question raised by Wells Fargo regarding its recognition of Local 807 as collective bargaining representative." Kelley recalled how the Local 807 membership, on or about April 13, 1980, unanimously rejected the Employer's "final offer." During the ensuing strike, Kelley received a copy of General Counsel's Exhibit 14, a letter dated April 17 which was mailed or distributed by Respondent to its striking employees, stating, inter alia:

> Collective bargaining between your Union and your Company began on February 26, 1980, and some ten additional meetings were held until the talks concluded on April 11, 1980.
>
> During the course of these talks, the Company's representatives explained to the Union how, in the past, the condition of the business had so deteriorated that the Company's New York branch had been losing money for several years. These losses were due primarily to the ever-increasing number of non-Union competitors entering the armored car business in New York.
>
> Because of this serious condition, it was necessary for the Company to ask the Union and you to agree to changes in the contract—among them a reduction in the weekly guarantee from 42 to 40 hours, a deletion of the pick of runs and a change from mandatory 3-person crews to a system which would allow us to perform new business in a safe and secure manner with 2-person crews.
>
> Moreover, due to the poor business conditions in New York City, at the New York City branch, it was necessary for the Company to make a wage offer calling for holding-the-line on any wage increases for the first year of the contract, and an average wage adjustment of 62¢ per hour in the second year and 58¢ per hour in the third year of the New Agreement.
>
> Since at the Linden branch the business picture was not quite so grim, the Company was able to offer an average wage adjustment in the first year of 33¢ per hour, with an increase of 65¢ per hour in the second year and an additional 61¢ per hour in the third year.
>
> At both locations, the Company did agree to the adoption of the Teamster Welfare Plan in the contract's first year and to making improvements in that Plan in the second year of the Agreement.
>
> We urge you, therefore, to support your Company and your own future. Return to your Union officers and tell them you want to return to work. Tell them you're willing to make an investment in your future by accepting the Company's last offer for a new labor contract.

Kelley similarly received from the Company a copy of General Counsel's Exhibit 15, a letter dated April 24, stating, inter alia:

> Since the strike continues, effective Thursday May 1, 1980, Wells Fargo will no longer bear the economic burden of making benefit payments for [the enumerated health and insurance plans]. . . . We urge you to return to your Union officials, tell them you want the strike to end, and that you want to return to work. In this way, cancellation of your benefits can be avoided.[3]

Robert Relay testified that he is the fund manager of the Local 807 Armored Car Pension Fund; that previously this fund was known as the Local 820 Armored Car Pension Fund; and that this change was made as a result of the meeting of fund trustees on or about July 17, 1979. (See G.C. Exh. 19. Also see G.C. Exhs. 20, 17 and 12.) Relay recalled that, after the fund was "converted to the 807 Pension Fund" in July 1979, Respondent "participated" by, inter alia, "contributing." The last "contributions" were made by the Company in June 1980 for the "period of the first two weeks in April."

Respondent Wells Fargo attempts to justify its withdrawal of recognition from Local 807 in June 1980 by now claiming, inter alia, that Local 807, unlike Local 820, was not sufficiently "security minded." In support of this and related contentions, Timothy Hughes, vice president in charge of the Employer's industrial relations, cites, among others, the following "reasons" which assertedly privileged such withdrawal: Local 820, unlike Local 807, was comprised entirely of "guards"; Local 820 did not challenge the "reasonableness" of its security rules, Local 820 expressed a "policy" that "they would cross a picket line"; Local 807's president Joseph Mangan had assured Hughes during an early July 1979 meeting that "he intended to establish a kind of separate division within Local 807 to be entirely concerned with the armored car industry" and "there would be no changes . . . with respect to the Pension Plan" or "Pension Committee"; there were, following the takeover by Local 807 in 1979, unfair labor practice charges and/or petitions filed by employees who opposed the merger or takeover; Local 807, during the 1980 bargaining sessions, "did not want to expand the use of polygraph" tests of employees as provided in the 1977-1980 contract; Local 807 similarly did not want "to expand the no-strike language to include sympathy strikes" or to include "management rights" language; and members of Local 807 engaged in "misconduct" during their strike. Hughes claimed that—after having been requested by Local 807 to bargain for a new contract during early 1980 (see R. Exh. 40)—he "had discussions with the officers of the Company" concerning the "chain of events that had occurred up to that point,"

[3] Also see the testimony of striking employee John Kelley, who later received a copy of G.C. Exh. 22, a telegram from the Employer dated June 5, 1980, stating inter alia, that "effective June 2, 1980, Wells Fargo . . . withdrew its voluntary recognition of Local 807."

> . . . and, at that point, did discuss the possibility of terminating the relationship, but we said that we would at least go in and hear what they had to say with respect to the labor agreement.

Elsewhere, Hughes acknowledged that Local 820, in the past, had challenged in grievance proceedings the discipline of unit employees predicated upon company security rules; that Local 820's 1977–1980 contract generally permits employees to refuse to cross a lawful primary picket line and "to arbitrate the reasonableness" of the Employer's work rules (see G.C. Exh. 2, pp. 54 and 21); that the Employer did not "challenge" or protest Local 807's "merger" or authority to represent the unit employees; that he "never told Local 807 that [he was] withdrawing recognition because it did not set up a separate armored car division" or notified Local 807 of the "possibility of ending the relationship depending upon what happened in [his] dealings with Local 807"; that he never informed Local 807 that he was "conditioning recognition on what Local 807 might propose or demand in the bargaining relationship"; that he never advised Local 807 that "he would not continue recognizing the Union or [was] considering . . . not continuing because they had changed the trustees of the Pension Plan"; that he, in fact, as a trustee, voted "to change the name of the Pension Fund from" Local 820 to "Local 807 Armored Car Pension Fund"; that Local 807 "maintains a separate Pension Fund"; that Local 820, like Local 807, struck for its last contract and, in fact, Local 820 had engaged in a "wildcat strike"; that he did not witness any "misconduct" on the part of a Local 807 representative during the 1980 strike; and that "at no time" during the 1980 negotiations "did the Employer inform [Local 807] that it intended to withdraw recognition or was considering withdrawing recognition from the Union."[4] Hughes was asked with reference to his "last offer" to Local 807: "[Y]ou related to the Union if they acquiesce in that proposal there would be a collective bargaining agreement" "if they agreed to [the Employer's] proposal?" Hughes replied: "[Y]es." Elsewhere, Hughes testified:

> Q. Is it fair to state Mr. Hughes, that had the employees accepted the Company's last offer as the Company implored them to do in G.C. Exh. 14, that the Company would have continued recognition?
>
> A. I don't think it is fair to state that.

Hughes further claimed that on June 2, 1980, when the Employer withdrew recognition from Local 807, he met with Teamsters International representative Albert Barlow and then "laid out [the] whole chain of events" resulting in the Company's decision to withdraw recognition. Hughes assertedly "explained the whole series of reasons." Elsewhere, Hughes acknowledged that his prehearing affidavit, given to a Board agent on June 9, 1980, only states:

> On 6/2/80, prior to my mailing of the letters to the Union, I met with Albert Barlow an International Rep. for the Teamsters for the Eastern Conference, in Arlington, Virginia. I had dealt with him before on different contract matters, when the guards were under Local 820's jurisdiction. I informed him that the Comany was withdrawing recognition from Local 807 because the Union admitted both guards and non-guards to membership. He said he'd notify his superiors.

There is no other reference to additional "reasons" in this affidavit.[5]

In addition, Hughes also claimed that he had heard of an incident during April 1980, where Local 807 employee-members refused to cross a picket line of a customer, Payomatic. Hughes, however, had no personal knowledge of this alleged incident. Hughes admittedly never cited this incident to Local 807 as a reason for withdrawing recognition in June 1980. And, Local 807 Representative Votta explained, on rebuttal, that his Union in fact had picketed "Rapid Armored Car" from about October 1979 through April 1980, and not Payomatic, because Rapid refused "to recognize" or "bargain" with Local 807. Rapid and Payomatic were proximately located at the particular site; Rapid transported valuables and also serviced Payomatic's check-cashing operations; and Rapid had its truck parked at this site. Wells Fargo Branch Manager John Isaacs understood "that if was Rapid . . . they were picketing." (Also see the testimony of Union Representative Joseph Votta and Company Representatives John Isaacs and Joseph Prisciandaro pertaining to Local 807's "ambulatory picketing" of Wells Fargo during the 1980 strike.)

Edward Gamber, vice president in charge of security for Wells Fargo, claimed that, in his "opinion," the refusal of an armored car employee . . . to cross a picket line . . . creates a security problem." However, as noted, the 1977–1980 contract between the Employer and Local 820 permits unit employees to honor lawful primary picket lines and Local 820 never "modified" this provision. Gamber was also asked if unit drivers represented by Local 820 had "refused to cross picket lines at any time that [he] was associated with the Employer." Gamber acknowledged: "That probably occurred, I just never had no specific recollection."[6]

[4] Also see the testimony of J. Warren Mangan, counsel for Local 807, adduced on rebuttal, pertaining to the positions of the parties prior to the withdrawal of recognition on June 2, 1980.

[5] I note that, although Local 820 only represented "guard employees," there is no real dispute here that, because of its affiliation with the Teamsters International, it would at all times pertinent to this sequence be treated under Sec. 9(b)(3) as a so-called mixed guard Union. See generally G.C. Exh. 18, p. 2.

[6] Also see generally the testimony of Daniel Petrie and Jospeh Hurley, unit employees, concerning picket lines which they had refused to cross when Local 820 represented the employees. Company dispatcher William Stratford attempted to controvert the above testimony. At one point. however, Stratford testified:

> Q. Mr. Stratford, to your knowledge, if employees refused to cross a picket line, and therefore did not make a delivery or pick-up at a given customer, would that be reflected on documents in the Company records?
>
> A. Well, it would be reflected in our billing records, if we didn't service the customer, we wouldn't bill them for the service, so it would be reflected.

Continued

Respondent's Exhibit 42 is a list of the names of employers who, since Local 807's takeover of Local 820's contract in June 1979, have had collective-bargaining agreements with Local 807. There are approximately 400 names on this list. It is undisputed that Local 807 represents both guard and nonguard employees of these various employers. Only one of these named employers presently (at the time of hearing) is serviced by Wells Fargo—American Banknote Company. There are four other employers named on this list who were previously serviced by Wells Fargo and are no longer serviced by it. See generally the testimony of Kevin Cioffi, the Employer's district sales representative.

Finally, testimony and related documentary evidence was adduced with reference to the nature of the 1980 strike. Thus, Union Representative Votta testified that on or about June 3 or 4, 1980, following a telephone conversation with the Union's attorney pertaining to the Employer's withdrawal of recognition, he instructed and caused the members to change the language on the existing picket signs. The signs were then changed to state that "Wells Fargo refuses to bargain" and was "unfair." Votta thereafter observed pickets carrying these new signs. Votta, however, acknowledged that periodically old signs would be used and he would instruct the pickets involved "to change it." (Also see the testimony of Joseph Hurley, Fred Caputo, Michael Kelley, Daniel Petrie, and Michael Maguire explaining the changes in the picket signs.) On the other hand, Company Representative John Isaacs claimed that he saw old "on strike" signs about August 1980 and that the Union's signs were "first" changed during this hearing in 1981.

The sequence of events, as detailed above, is in large part uncontroverted and based on undisputed documentary evidence of record. There are, however, conflicts in the testimony of witnesses attempting to explain this chronology. On the entire record, including the demeanor of the witnesses, I am persuaded that the testimony of Joseph Votta, Michael Kelley, Robert Relay, John Kelley, J. Warren Mangan, Daniel Petrie, Joseph Hurley, Fred Caputo, and Michael Maguire, as quoted and referred to above, correctly and truthfully reflects the entire transaction culminating in the strike and the Employer's withdrawal of recognition from Local 807. Their testimony is in significant part mutually corroborative. Their testimony is also corroborated in large part by documentary evidence of record and further is substantiated by testimony of Timothy Hughes, John Isaacs, Jospeh Prisciandaro, Edward Gamber, and William Stratford. Insofar as the testimony of Votta, Michael and John Kelley, Relay, Mangan, Petrie, Hurley, Caputo, and Maguire differs from or with the testimony of Hughes, Isaacs, Prisciandaro, Gamber, and Stratford, I find here that the testimony of the former witnesses is a more complete, reliable, and trustworthy account of the pertinent facts. The testimony of Hughes, Gamber, Isaacs, Prisciandaro, and Stratford was, at times, incomplete, vague, contradictory, and evasive.

In particular, as discussed further below, I do not credit Hughes' assertions pertaining to the Employer's "reasons" for withdrawing recognition from Local 807. I find here that these belated, eschewed, shifting, and contradicted "reasons" for the Employer's summary withdrawal of recognition on June 2, 1980, are afterthoughts now offered in an attempt to justify the Employer's action. I find that the Employer's June 2 decision was, in fact, predicated solely on economic considerations, namely, Local 807's refusal to accept the Employer's "final offer." (See G.C. Exh. 14, quoted supra.) In short, the Employer's belatedly claimed "security" and "conflict" related "reasons" for refusing, after about 1 year, to bargain or deal any further with Local 807 are, on this record, plainly pretextual, and are not the real or true reasons for the action taken. Further, I do not credit Isaacs' related claim that the Union first changed its picket signs from "on strike" to "unfair" during this hearing in 1981. I credit instead Votta's substantiated and corroborated testimony, as detailed above.[7]

Discussion

Section 9(b)(3) of the National Labor Relations Act was enacted in 1947. It provides, in pertinent part:

Q. Would there be any specific notation, employees did not make pick-up or delivery because of picket line strike—would that be reflected on the Company records?

A. Yes.

. . . .

Q. And you have seen such notations on records, on route sheets, haven't you?

A. Yes.

Q. Can you tell us how many times that you've seen them on route sheets?

A. I have no idea.

Q. Would you say more than 10?

A. No.

Q. Do you remember any specific times that you saw such notations?

A. No.

Stratford's testimony was, at times, confusing and contradictory.

[7] Upon reconsideration, as requested by counsel for Respondent in his posthearing brief (pp. 8–10), I would receive previously rejected R. Exhs. 10 and 11 into evidence. Upon this entire record, they are sufficiently authenticated and relevant. Compare, however, G.C. Exh. 2, p. 54, the 1977–1980 contract language between Local 820 and Respondent pertaining to picket lines, and the testimony discussed above. In addition, on reconsideration, as further requested by counsel for Respondent in his posthearing brief (pp. 14–16), I adhere to my ruling which, in effect, refuses to allow Kevin Cioffi, a company district sales representative, to speculate who the Employer's "prospective customers" may be. I note that, at one point in his testimony, Cioffi acknowledged that his "use of the word prospective customer is not based on any ongoing negotiations or sales talk between the prospective customer and [his] Employer." Elsewhere, counsel for Respondent and then Cioffi generally claimed that Cioffi "has called upon" "in some instances" these so-called prospective customers.

Finally, I note that counsel for Respondent, in his posthearing brief (p. 26), states that "[d]uring the strike, members of Local 807 engaged in serious strike misconduct." The credited evidence of record does not support this assertion. Hughes admittedly had no direct knowledge of such misconduct. Hughes admittedly did not cite this alleged "reason" to Local 807 for withdrawing recognition prior to June 2, 1980. Indeed, the testimony of company representatives Isaacs and Prisciandaro with reference to Local 807's "ambulatory picketing" of Respondent's truck and the claimed "commotion" which resulted does not show "serious strike misconduct." Consequently, this alleged "reason" for management's June 2 determination, like the others referred to above, does not withstand close scrutiny and serves only to further bolster the finding that such "reasons" are plainly pretextual.

> The Board shall decide in each case . . . the unit appropriate for the purposes of collective bargaining . . . *Provided*, That the Board shall not . . . (3) decide that any unit is appropriate for such purposes if it includes, together with other employees, any individual employed as a guard . . . but no labor organization shall be certified as the representatives of employees in a bargaining unit of guards if such organization admits to membership, or is affiliated directly or indirectly with an organization which admits to membership, employees other than guards.

The impact of this language upon the statutory rights of "guard employees" has been the subject of much commentary by the Board and the courts. The United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit stated in *NLRB v. White Motor Corp.*, 404 F.2d 1100, 1103 (6th Cir. 1968), as follows:

> [We] think it is clear that Section 9(b)(3) does not operate to prevent guard employees from joining a labor organization, and this principle extends to labor organizations which also represent non-guard employees. Indeed, the real significance of Section 9(b)(3) is the restrictions which it imposes on the Board. Specifically, Section 9(b)(3) provides two things: (1) the Board may not determine that a unit is appropriate for purposes of collective bargaining if the unit includes both guards and non-guards; and (2) the Board may not certify a union as bargaining agent for guards if that union represents both guards and non-guards.
>
> If guard employees do join a union which also represents non-guards, their membership is not unlawful, and in fact an employer may, if it wishes, recognize such a union for purposes of collective bargaining.
>
> Since membership by guard employees in a union which also represents non-guards is not unlawful, it would be an unfair labor practice for an employer to take discriminatory action against guard employees on account of such membership.

The court made "it abundantly clear that, absent [the employer's] consent, the [mixed guard on nonqualified union] may not represent the guards." The court, however, explained (*Id.* at fn. 5):

> It is true that the I.A.M. [the mixed guard union] could never be certified as bargaining agent for the guards but this does not change the fact that the guards have a right under § 7 of the Act to be members of the I.A.M. To hold otherwise would attribute too much to certification. It would, in effect, be saying that no labor organization has rights under the Act save a certified one. Certification gives an organization which achieves it additional rights not all its rights. See *United Mine Workers of America* v. *Arkansas Oak Flooring*, 351 U.S. 62, 70–72 76 S.Ct. 559, 100 L.Ed. 941 (1956); *Brooks* v. *N.L.R.B*, 348 U.S. 96, 75 S.Ct. 176, 99 L.Ed. 125 (1954); *N.L.R.B.* v. *Kobritz*, 193 F.2d 8 (1st Cir. 1951); § 9(c)(3); National Labor Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. § 159(c)(3) (1964).

More recently, in *Bally's Park Place*, 257 NLRB 777 (1981), the Board similarly stated:

> The Act deprives a nonqualified [mixed guard] union only of the benefits of certification. Guards have the right to designate as their bargaining agent a union which the Board is proscribed from certifying. By permitting a nonqualified intervenor to appear on the ballot, we will be acting in accordance with Section 9(b)(3) and will be contributing to stable labor relations by allowing employees to express fully their wishes as to a collective-bargaining agent. Thus, we hold that the statutory proscription in Section 9(b)(3) against certifying affiliated labor organizations to represent "guard units" does not prohibit putting such labor organizations on the ballot and certifying the arithmetic results when the election is won by such organization.

In like vein, the Board, in *Burns Detective Agency*, 134 NLRB 451, 453 (1961), reasoned that "a contract unit comprised exclusively of guards is not invalidated merely because the representative of that unit admits to membership, or is affiliated with an organization which admits to membership nonguard employees. Accordingly, we perceive no basis in the instant case for withholding the application of our normal contract-bar rules. The application of these rules is not contingent on a prior certification." Also see *Burns Detective Agency*, 138 NLRB 449, 452 (1962).

And, in *Amoco Oil Co.*, 221 NLRB 1104 (1975), the Board ordered the employer, inter alia, to notify the mixed-guard or nonqualified union "that it will recognize and deal" with the union's designated representative "concerning the negotiation and administration of the parties' collective-bargaining agreements and the handling of grievances and other matters relating to rates of pay, wages, hours of employment, and other terms and conditions of employment." The Board explained:

> We particularly note that the Respondent voluntarily recognizes the union, which is the certified representative of its production and maintenance employees, as the representative of its plant guards. The union cannot be certified by this Agency as the representative of plant guards because it admits other employees to membership; but a plant guard unit is appropriate and the Respondent does not question the Union's status as the representative of either unit. This relationship, in one from or another, has endured for almost 40 years and there is no indication that the Respondent is dissatisfied with it; it has not attempted to alter it and has voiced no objection to it here.
>
> Admitting the union's status as the collective-bargaining representative of the two units of its employees, and without attacking the bargaining relationship, the Respondent claims the right to refuse to deal with an individual whom its production and

> maintenance employees have elected to represent them on behalf of the Union. Congress has given to employees the exclusive right to select their own representatives, and once the unit and a bargaining representative for it is validly recognized by the Respondent, Respondent cannot refuse thereafter to deal with the individuals selected by the employees as their spokesmen absent some statutory or other legal impediment. None exists here, and as Respondent has not demonstrated any legally acceptable justification for its refusal to recognize the individual selected, its refusal is in violation of Section 8(a)(5) of the Act.

As the above cases show, and counsel do not seriously dispute here, an employer, having voluntarily granted recognition to a so-called "mixed guard" or nonqualified union which cannot be certified by the Board under Section 9(b)(3), may nonetheless be held to have impinged upon the unit employees' rights under Section 7, Section 8(a)(1) and (3), and even Section 8(a)(5) of the Act. Accordingly, it is settled that an employer, like Respondent, was not obligated to recognize initially or de novo Local 807, or its predecessor Local 820, as the collective-bargaining agent of its "guard employees."[8] However, having voluntarily granted such recognition, as this record makes clear, can it then, under the circumstances present here, summarily reverse its decision and refuse to bargain without running afoul of the unit employees' Section 7 and Section 8(a)(1) and (5) rights. A somewhat similar issue was addressed by the administrative law judge in *MRA Associates*, 245 NLRB 676, 678 (1979), in part as follows:

> [E]ven if the affiliation existed at the time of the alleged refusal to bargain herein . . . I would not conclude that Section 9(b)(3) privileged Respondent to refuse to bargain with and to withdraw recognition from the Union. . . . [T]his legislation has never been interpreted to deny validity to bargaining units where the parties have voluntarily agreed to representation in such units. . . . To allow Respondent to avoid its bargaining obligation with the Union in this case simply because the union is affiliated with . . . a nonguard union, would be an unduly mechanistic application of the law, particularly where, as here, [the nonguard union] does not represent any of Respondent's employees [citing *Burns* and *Amoco*, supra].

The Board, in *MRA*, supra at fn. 2, noting that the "affiliation" with the nonguard union "ended" before the relevant time period and therefore is no defense to a refusal to bargain charge, stated: "Accordingly, we find it unnecessary to pass upon the Administrative Law Judge's discussion of whether, if the affiliation existed at the time of the alleged unfair labor practices, Respondent could lawfully have refused to bargain based on that affiliation."

However, the Board, with court approval, has dealt with analogous and related issues and contentions. Thus, in *International Telephone & Telegraph Corp. v. NLRB*, 382 F.2d 366, 370 (3d Cir. 1967), the court, in agreement with the Board, stated:

> The Board found that the petitioner's withdrawal of recognition of the union as representative of the professional employees violated section 8(a)(5) and (1) of the Act. In reaching its decision, the Board assumed that the failure to provide a separate election for the professional employees in 1951 made that election illegal. See *Leedom v. Kyne*, 1958, 358 U.S. 184, 79 S.Ct. 180, 3 L.Ed. 2d 210. But to concede that point is not to say that every unit composed of professionals and non-professionals originally formed without a separate election is invalid forever. Though section 9(b)(1) prohibits the Board from designating a mixed unit without holding the requisite election of professionals, nothing in the language of the Act prohibits the relevant parties from maintaining and recognizing such a unit consensually. *Retail Clerks Union Local 324 (Vincent Drugs)*, 1963, 144 NLRB 1247. In our view such a consensual arrangement is presented here. At no time between 1951 and 1964 did either the petitioner or the professional employees challenge the unit or seek its decertification. The petitioner could have brought the question of alleged improper certification to a head immediately by refusing to bargain in 1951 and litigating the issue before the Board and the courts in an unfair labor practice proceeding. More significantly, even after the 1958 decision in *Leedom v. Kyne*, supra, which put the parties on notice that the original certification was made in error, they negotiated and entered into new contracts in 1959 and 1961 without questioning the composition of the unit. The Board reasonably found that this conduct constituted consent on the part of both parties to a mixed bargaining unit consisting of professional and non-professional employees. . . . In these circumstances, the error in the original determination of the bargaining unit does not justify the present refusal to bargain with it.
>
> Nor can it be said that the petitioner's refusal to bargain was grounded on and justified by good-faith doubt as to the union's majority within the existing unit. . . . The Board permissibly found that the petitioner's refusal to bargain with Local 400 as representative of the entire group of employees in the engineer-technician unit constituted an unjustified disruption of the bargaining process violative of section 8(a)(5) and (1).

The Board, in *International Telephone*, supra, explained the basis for its 8(a)(5) finding as follows (159 NLRB 1757, 1763–1764 (1966)): "Had the Respondent been unwilling to accept the unit on a voluntary basis, opportunities were available to it to test the unit question at the

[8] The General Counsel and Respondent do not seriously controvert, and this record establishes, that Respondent's unit employees are "guards" under Sec. 9(b)(3); and Local 807, like Local 820, is a mixed-guard or nonqualified union, as discussed above. See *Armored Motor Service*, 106 NLRB 1139 (1953), and *Teamsters Local 71 v. NLRB*, 553 F.2d 1368, 1372–1374 (D.C. Cir. 1977).

time of the 1959 and 1961 reopenings. It took no steps to do so. . . . Significantly, it was not until after such negotiations [in 1964] had been underway for some time, and a strike had occurred, that the Respondent decided to withdraw recognition from the Union as the representative of the mixed unit . . . . [We] hold that the Respondent is estopped at this time from disputing the appropriateness of the unit."

Applying the foregoing principles to the credited evidence of record here, I find and conclude that Respondent Employer, having voluntarily recognized Local 807 as bargaining agent for an appropriate unit of its "guard employees," acted in derogation of the unit employees' statutory rights and its obligation to bargain in good faith when it summarily withdrew that recognition and refused to bargain any further with Local 807 1 year later, on or about June 2, 1980. Thus, as detailed supra, Respondent Employer accorded Local 807 full and voluntary recognition as bargaining agent for the unit employees immediately following the takeover by Local 807 during June 1979. Local 807 administered the existing contract between the parties. Dues were checked off and forwarded to Local 807. Grievances and arbitrations were processed to completion. And, when the existing 1977–1980 contract expired, the parties voluntarily entered upon negotiations for a new agreement. Indeed, during the 14 bargaining sessions, the parties twice agreed to extend the 1977–1980 contract and to "retroactivity." At no time during the sequence did Respondent Employer assert or warn Local 807 that it was, for any reason, contemplating the withdrawal of the recognition previously granted to Local 807, or earlier to its predecessor Local 820. Consequently, Local 807 and its membership could reasonably believe that the Employer, having voluntarily granted recognition to Local 807 as it had done for many years earlier with respect to Local 820, would bargain in good faith and fulfill its statutory obligation during the efforts by the parties to reach a new agreement.

However, during the bargaining sessions, it became apparent that the parties were far apart principally on economic issues. At the April 11 bargaining session, the Employer made a "final offer." The Local 807 membership, at a meeting on April 13, rejected this "final offer" and voted to strike in support of the Union's economic position. A strike ensued. During the strike, the Employer did not claim or warn that it would withdraw recognition. On the contrary, the Employer repeatedly urged the unit employees to get their Union, Local 807, to accept the "final offer" and end the strike. Again, Local 807 and the unit employees could reasonably believe that the Employer would continue to honor at this critical time the ongoing bargaining obligation voluntarily incurred. On May 28, during the strike, the parties met again. Local 807 was asked if there was room for any movement. Local 807 modified its economic position. However, the Employer ended the negotiations and, on June 2, summarily withdrew recognition citing the Union's mixed guard status as its "reason."

Respondent Employer, under the circumstances present here, was estopped from thus withdrawing the voluntary recognition previously granted to Local 807. Respondent Employer, at no time during this 12-month period, warned or otherwise apprised Local 807 and its membership of such contemplated action. I have, as found supra, rejected as afterthoughts and pretexts management's now asserted "security" and "conflict" related "reasons" for this untimely action. The record shows, in any event, that these alleged "reasons" did not stop the Employer throughout this 12-month period from voluntarily dealing with Local 807 in satisfaction of its statutory bargaining obligation. Indeed, the Employer never claimed a "conflict" or "security" problem or made the various related assertions now advanced. And, as also noted above, these alleged "reasons" for the June 2 withdrawal do not withstand scrutiny. Thus, for example, the Employer claims that Local 807, unlike Local 820, would not cross picket lines. The 1977–1980 contract with Local 820 permitted the Union to honor a lawful primary picket line. In like vein, the Employer's claim that Local 807 challenged its security rules is, on this record, without support. Again, the 1977–1980 contract permitted such challenges and, further, Local 820 attacked the discipline given to employees under these rules. Moreover, as for the claimed "conflict," actual or potential, this record does not demonstrate such a basis for the withdrawal here. The one furnished isolated example of such a "conflict" with a customer, Payomatic, was credibly explained as a strike by Local 807 against a proximately located carrier. In any event, none of these alleged and belatedly cited "reasons" were furnished to Local 807 prior to the summary withdrawal of recognition.

Accordingly, I find and conclude that the withdrawal of recognition on June 2 was a violation of Section 8(a)(5) and (1) of the Act. Although counsel seek also to argue that, on one hand, the Employer can withdraw recognition "anytime" or, on the other hand, that the Employer cannot withdraw recognition absent a good-faith doubt of continued majority status, I need not here explore the boundaries of this bargaining obligation voluntarily incurred. In short, I find that the June 2 withdrawal, on these facts, was in derogation of the statutory obligation voluntarily incurred.

Further, I find that the economic strike, then in progess, was converted on or about June 2 to an unfair labor practice strike in protest over the Employer's unlawful action. The unlawful withdrawal of recognition, on this record, clearly prolonged the strike, and it still continues. The picket signs were changed to reflect this protest of unfair conduct. Surely, the settlement of such a strike was delayed by this unawful withdrawal of recognition. Cf. *Soule Glass & Glazing Co. v. NLRB*, 652 F.2d 1055, 1079–1082 (1st Cir. 1981), and cases discussed.

In sum, I find and conclude that Respondent Employer violated Section 8(a)(5) and (1) by its withdrawal of recognition on or about June 2, 1980, and that the strike was then converted into an unfair labor practice strike.[9]

[9] Counsel for Respondent, in contending that the Employer properly withdrew recognition, cites various cases which are inapposite here. Thus, for example, in *Mack Mfg. Corp.*, 107 NLRB 209 (1953), the Board revoked the certification previously issued and, consequently, dismissed

Continued

CONCLUSIONS OF LAW

1. Respondent Company is an employer engaged in commerce as alleged.

2. Charging Party Local 807 is a labor oranization as alleged.

3. Respondent violated Section 8(a)(5) and (1) of the Act by withdrawing recognition on or about June 2, 1980, from Local 807, as bargaining agent of its employees in the appropriate unit described below. The appropriate unit is:

> All employees working on armored trucks and those who are employed in its meter collection operation at Respondent's facilities located in the New York City Metropolitan area, including Westchester, Nassau, Suffolk, Orange, Putnam, and Rockland Counties in New York, and Essex, Bergen, Hudson, Passaic, Union and Morris Counties in New Jersey, but excluding all other employees, and supervisors as defined in the Act.

4. The strike herein, which commenced on or about April 14, 1980, was converted into an unfair labor practice strike on or about June 2, 1980, because it was prolonged by Respondent's unfair labor practices.

5. The unfair labor practices found above affect commerce as alleged.

REMEDY

Having found that Respondent violated Section 8(a)(5) and (1) of the Act, Respondent will be directed to cease and desist from engaging in such conduct, or like or related conduct, and to post the attached notice. Respondent will also be directed to, upon request, bargain with Local 807 as the exclusive bargaining representative of the employees in the unit found appropriate and, if an agreement is reached, to embody such agreement in a signed contract. Further, having found that the strike herein was converted into an unfair labor practice strike on or about June 2, 1980, and the strike apparently continues, Respondent will be directed, upon application, to offer to striking employees reinstatement to their former or substantially equivalent positions, without prejudice to their seniority or other rights and privileges, as follows:

1. Striking employees whose jobs were not filled by permanent replacements before June 2, 1980, are, upon application, to be offered immediate reinstatement, dismissing persons hired on or after that date, if necessary, to make room for them.

2. Any striker whose job was filled by a permanent replacement prior to June 2, 1980, is, upon application, to be offered reinstatement upon departure of that replacement.

Further, in the event Respondent does not reinstate the striking employees in the manner set forth above within 5 days from the date reinstatement is required, backpay shall commence running from the date on which the 5 days expires, in the manner as prescribed in *F. W. Woolworth Co.*, 90 NLRB 289 (1950), with interest to be computed as set forth in *Florida Steel Corp.*, 231 NLRB 651 (1977).[10]

The number of striking employees and the situation with regard to replacements were not litigated at the hearing. These matters, together with anything else required to determine to whom offers of reinstatement must be made and what backpay, if any, is due, may, if necessary, be litigated in a backpay proceeding.

[Recommended Order omitted from publication.]

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the unfair labor practice complaint. Likewise, in *Supreme Sugar Co.*, 258 NLRB 243 (1981), the administrative law judge, whose decision was adopted without comment by the Board, pertinently noted: "I cannot find that a unit which includes watchmen is appropriate . . . I shall therefore recommend that the complaint be dismissed." And, *Teamsters Local 71 v. NLRB*, 553 F.2d 1368 (D.C. Cir. 1977), involves the interplay of the proscriptions of Sec. 8(b)(7) against certain picketing and a nonqualified union. The court pertinently noted: "To tolerate continued picketing after dismissal of the Union's petition would bestow on petitioner greater rights than are afforded qualifying union."

[10] See generally *Isis Plumbing Co.*, 138 NLRB 716 (1962).